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David A. Super

ABSTRACT
Administrative law is fundamentally a regime of soft power. Congress, the President, administrative
agencies, civil servants, and the courts all operate within a broad consensus for rational, goodfaith decisionmaking. Congress grants agencies discretion, and courts and civil servants defer to
agencies’ political leadership based largely on the expectation that the latter are seeking to honor
statutes’ purposes. That expectation of prudential restraint also allays concerns about delegations of
legislative power. When the executive systematically disregards that expectation and seeks singlemindedly to maximize achievement of its policy objectives, deference’s justification breaks down.
Across agencies, the Trump administration has disregarded the assumptions on which
administrative law’s soft power consensus depends. Its waivers allowing states to deny Medicaid
to otherwise eligible low-income people unable to find employment exemplifies this disregard.
Exploiting a sweeping delegation of authority to test new ways to achieve Medicaid’s goal of
providing health care coverage, this administration has instead sought to achieve very different
goals, from legislation that Congress has rejected. The waiver applications themselves estimate
substantial increases in the numbers of uninsured people.
Ignoring the administration’s disregard of the longstanding administrative law consensus could
deter future Congresses from valuable delegations of discretion. Permanently abandoning the
deferential soft-power model would seriously undermine future governance. Instead, courts and
civil servants should treat this period as a hiatus in consensus for good-faith decisionmaking.
Courts should suspend deference and other aspects of soft-power jurisprudence. And civil servants
should comply with political officials’ lawful directions but should remain steadfastly truthful in
their words and actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law, more than any other branch of public law, has always
been characterized by a delicate mix of hard and soft power. Political
appointees can overrule career staff, but the system makes that cumbersome,
and they rarely do. Though career staff can substitute their own policy
preferences for those of their agencies’ political leaders, the system makes that
difficult, and they rarely do. And Congress can override agencies’
interpretations of statutes, but scarce resources make that difficult, and it rarely
does.
Courts, too, have developed a nuanced approach toward exercising soft
power to vindicate important norms. To be sure, courts have maintained a
formidable arsenal of hard-power weapons, but they make a point of rarely
using them. Many of the most celebrated administrative law cases involve
courts deferring to the substantive or procedural judgments of agencies. Even
in those relatively rare cases in which courts do interfere with an agency’s
actions, the Court has made a point of not precluding the agency from
persisting in its chosen course. For example, the Court rejected the SEC’s first
foray against the Chenerys,1 but it carefully left the door open for future agency
sanctions on a different theory. The Court then demonstrated that this really
was a soft-power regime when it affirmed the SEC’s actions after the case came
up a second time.2 For their part, agencies typically take the hint: For example,
although the Court did not construe federal statutes as prohibiting highway
construction through Overton Park,3 its strong skepticism was enough to get
the Department of Transportation to change course.4
The maintenance of a soft-power regime of administrative law depends
on broad structural consensus. Career staff must accept the legitimacy of
political appointees; political appointees must assume that career civil servants
will take seriously their directions, subject to constraints of law and feasibility
but not personal ideological disagreement; and courts must believe that
agencies’ actions reflect the considered judgment of career officials making
good-faith efforts to follow the law.
1.
2.
3.
4.

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971).
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974)
(affirming agency’s subsequent rejection of road).
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In several ways, this structural consensus depends significantly on the
repetitive nature of administrative law interactions. Career staff know that,
over time, they will have to work with political appointees of both parties; their
success and longevity depends on being perceived as honest brokers by
whomever the political process sends their way. In addition, when they find
particular appointees’ guidance distasteful, they can look forward to new
political masters whose preferences are more to their liking. Congress refrains
from overturning every action it dislikes because it does not want to
demoralize agencies it needs to carry out its initiatives in other areas. Courts
assume that agencies will not act outlandishly lest they damage their
reputations and imperil their chances in inevitable future litigation on other
issues.
It follows, then, that when this structural consensus frays, the soft-power
regime of administrative law will become unworkable. This is particularly
true when key actors cease to be, or cease to regard themselves as, long-term
repeat players. Instead of a heavily iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in which rational
players will quickly begin to cooperate, we move to individual games, in which
the incentives to defect are quite powerful.
This Article argues that we have entered such a period of dissensus about
the structure of the administrative state. The Trump administration, in word
and deed, has rejected the broad structural consensus about the means and
limits of administrative law that have existed since the New Deal. Perhaps even
more crucially, the administration has acted and seemed to act in ways that are
temporally discontinuous from its predecessors and from any successors that
do not share its policy views. This president is often sharply estranged from
much of his own party, has faced catastrophic polling since his early days in
office, and is under an investigation that threatens his ability to serve out his
term. He has faced unprecedented turnover among his political appointees.5
Only the naïve would believe that his administration expects sufficient repeat
interactions with other important actors to constrain its behavior. Moreover,
high-level officials have bragged about their insubordination to journalists and,
in an anonymous op-ed, have suggested a total breakdown of crucial

5.

Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Why Is Trump’s Staff Turnover Higher Than the 5 Most Recent
Presidents?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-istrumps-staff-turnover-higher-than-the-5-most-recent-presidents
[https://perma.cc/Q2D3-8FBT].
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assumptions of deference and respect for the rule of law within the
administration.6
This collapse in structural consensus requires a suspension, although not a
termination, of the soft-power model of administrative law. In particular, the two
main institutional guardians of administrative legality and continuity—the
courts and career civil servants—can and should adopt a far less deferential
approach to this administration’s actions of questionable legality. Fortunately,
our system of administrative law provides ample means both for responding to
this extraordinary situation while it lasts and for returning to the soft-power
regime of administrative law when the emergency passes. This course is far
superior to either ignoring the current administration’s fundamental
discontinuity from its predecessors, on the one hand, or making permanent
changes to a basically sound regime of administrative law, on the other.
To make this argument more concrete, this Article focuses on one of the
many exceptional actions this administration has taken: using the Social
Security Act’s section 1115 “demonstration project” authority to encourage
states to impose “work requirements” on Medicaid recipients. This Article
begins with a brief description of this action and the questions concerning its
legality. It then moves on to consider the tools available to the judiciary to
check this action. From here, it assesses how civil servants might plausibly
respond. Finally, it looks ahead to how various possible responses will position
administrative law when the present conditions pass.
I.

MEDICAID, SECTION 1115, AND “WORK REQUIREMENTS”

The Medicaid statute does not allow otherwise eligible people to be denied
coverage for noncompliance with work requirements in most circumstances7
and prohibits both federal and state agencies from narrowing statutory
eligibility criteria.8 On January 11, 2018, however, the Trump administration
released policy guidance announcing its receptivity to states’ requests for
6.

7.
8.

Philip Rucker et al., ‘The Sleeper Cells Have Awoken’: Trump and Aides Shaken by
‘Resistance’ Op-Ed, WASH. POST, (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/the-sleeper-cells-have-awoken-trump-and-aides-shaken-by-resistance-oped/2018/09/05/ecdf423c-b14b-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.bb76fefb74c0
[https://perma.cc/7C53-53KS].
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1(b)(3) (2012) (allowing states to terminate Medicaid only for adults
whose TNAF-funded cash assistance is terminated for violation of work rules).
See id. § 1396a(a)(8) (requiring provision of Medicaid with reasonable promptness to all
applicants meeting federal eligibility criteria); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(interpreting similar language in former Aid to Families with Dependent Children statute
as barring states from adding eligibility conditions).
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waivers to impose “work requirements” on Medicaid recipients.9 The next day,
it approved the first such waiver for Kentucky.10 It subsequently approved
similar ones for Indiana,11 Arkansas,12 and New Hampshire.13 It has at least
eight more pending.14
A.

Section 1115: “Demonstration Project” Authority

Congress added section 111515 to the Social Security Act in 1962.16
Subsection (a)(1) provides that for “any experimental, pilot, or demonstration
project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting
the objectives of [the Act’s cash assistance, child support enforcement, or
Medicaid titles] in a State or States . . . the Secretary may waive compliance with
any of the requirements of [many of the eligibility-creating sections of those
titles], as the case may be, to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to
enable such State or States to carry out such project.” Section 1115(a)(2) also
allows states to claim federal matching funds for expenditures on these projects
that would not otherwise qualify under programmatic rules. The resulting
policy changes are commonly termed “1115 waivers.”

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
16.

Letter From Brian Neale, Dir., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/
federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7GP-HSUK].
Letter From Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Adam Meier,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of Governor Matthew Bevin (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/kentucky-1115-memo-andapproval-ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVK8-GGWW].
Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Approves New Healthy Indiana
Medicaid Demonstration (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/02/02/
hhs-approves-new-healthy-indiana-medicaid-demonstration.html [https://perma.cc/CX7BHTYM].
Letter From Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Asa
Hutchinson, Governor of Ark. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QEH-86ZF].
Letter From Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to Henry D.
Lipman, Medicaid Dir., N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (May 7, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/
1115/downloads/nh/nh-health-protection-program-premium-assistance-ca.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5YY-AS8P].
Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and Pending Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 27, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/
issue-brief/which-states-have-approved-and-pending-section-1115-medicaid-waivers
[https://perma.cc/2NX4-UEBE].
42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012).
Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare at the time of
this section’s enactment, described it as a minor administrative provision that
would facilitate research.17 For its first quarter century, that is all it was. A state
might, for example, test the effects of a different benefit calculation formula on
work incentives or of making payments directly to landlords (rather than
directly to households) on eviction rates. Researchers would analyze the
project’s results, with particularly promising ones giving rise to proposals to
Congress or the federal agency for policy changes.
Late in the Reagan administration, however, some enterprising White
House officials recognized section 1115’s potential to allow states to change
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in ways the
Democratic Congress was unlikely to approve. These 1115 waivers sometimes
operated statewide; the policies they implemented, such as harsher penalties for
families with very young children, were not so much ones whose impact was
unknown as ones for which no national political consensus existed. The
George H. W. Bush administration continued and expanded section 1115’s role
in circumventing recipient protections in the AFDC statute.18 President
Clinton, having campaigned on “welfare reform” but having great difficulty
crafting legislation that reconciled his various promises, felt unable to restrict
the availability of waivers and indeed hoped they could buy off disgruntled
governors who were pressing for enactment of Republican welfare bills. By the
time the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
199619 repealed AFDC, the program’s rules were still in effect in a shrinking
minority of states.20
Several administrations relied on 1115 waivers to promote Medicaid
managed care.21 The George W. Bush administration encouraged states to seek
1115 waivers to subsidize employer-sponsored coverage for low wage workers,
to expand pharmaceutical coverage for the elderly, and to narrow benefits to
fund expanded coverage. The Obama administration briefly explored granting
1115 waivers to expand the range of activities that could meet cash assistance
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Wilbur J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, 20 PUB.
WELFARE 191 (1962).
Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
“Reform”, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741 (1993); Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section
1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 8 (1994).
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program
in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
See generally Michele Johnson & Kristin Ware, Medicaid Expansion by Any Other Name:
Exploring the Feasibility of Expanded Access to Care in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 1
BELMONT L. REV. 119 (2014).
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work requirements but quickly backed down when Congress objected. All
these waivers, however, operated within the basic frameworks of the programs:
to promote self-sufficiency (in the case of cash assistance programs) and to
expand access to health care (in the case of Medicaid).
Indeed, even within those purposes, these administrations refrained from
using section 1115 as a substitute for legislation. Thus, either the Clinton or
Obama administrations could have used section 1115 to establish near-universal
health coverage regimes similar to those they instead asked Congress to enact:
Although administrations customarily have insisted that waivers to be budgetneutral to the federal government, section 1115 does not require that. Doing so
would have had ample legal and political precedent. The fact that neither even
considered that sort of aggressive exercise of hard-power in pursuit of their
highest priority demonstrates the strength of the norms of the pre–Trump
administrative state. Casting aside those norms would have permanently
damaged their relationships with Congress, the courts, and the civil service,
which would be unthinkable for administrations seeing themselves as repeat
players.
B.

“Work Requirements”

Although most people assume that a “work requirement” is designed only
to punish those who refuse to accept available employment, the term has
changed dramatically over the years to refer to time limits on public benefits.22
For example, section 6(o) of the Food and Nutrition Act,23 which the Trump
administration’s policy guidance on Medicaid waivers24 praises, is entitled
“work requirement” but in fact imposes a firm three-month cutoff of food
assistance to unemployed recipients without any requirement that recipients
unable to find private employment be offered a chance to work in exchange for
further assistance. Despite generous financial incentives to do so, only a
handful of states have committed to offering time-limited recipients unpaid
community work opportunities as a means of maintaining eligibility for
benefits.25 Further evidence that low-income people unable to find private

22.
23.
24.
25.

David A. Super, Opinion, ‘Work Requirements’ for Public Benefits Are Really Just Time
Limits, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oesuper-work-requirements-20180115-story.html [https://perma.cc/6V83-E37L].
7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2012).
See Letter From Brian Neale, supra note 9.
ED BOLEN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MORE THAN 500,000 ADULTS
WILL LOSE SNAP BENEFITS IN 2016 AS WAIVERS EXPIRE 12 n.21 (2016),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-will-lose-snap-
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employment will simply be denied aid comes from the Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) program, which was enacted on the promise that it
would make recipients work for their benefits. Instead, states simply denied aid
to desperately poor people. Twenty years after the 1996 welfare law created
TANF, states operated only 15,007 “workfare” slots nationwide.26
Even when the state ostensibly commits itself to providing opportunities
to work for those unable to find private-sector jobs, bureaucratic shortcomings
cause large numbers of people to be sanctioned improperly.27 Because of fiscal
crises brought on by the Great Recession, states have radically shrunk their
eligibility staffs and closed numerous local offices. The highly automated and
centralized agencies that remain lack the capacity to match recipients with
work sites, determine qualifications for exemptions based on physical or
mental limitations, sort out problems caused by lost or stolen mail, or perform
the rest of the labor-intensive chores required to run work programs.
Although the various states seeking Medicaid “work requirement” waivers
may have different things in mind, some states appear to intend policies like
those applied to childless adult SNAP recipients: disqualifying people whether
or not employment is available to them. The administration’s guidance
appears to invite that, and Kentucky’s waiver seems to allow it.
Independent analysts and even supporters of the new requirements to find
and keep employment conclude that states will not provide recipients
opportunities to work in exchange for continued benefits. In analyzing a
House-passed proposal to disqualify several million more unemployed SNAP
recipients, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that
states will be operating only 110,000 unpaid work slots per month by the end
of the tenth year after enactment.28 Similarly, Kentucky estimates that tens of

26.
27.

28.

benefits-in-2016-as-waivers-expire#_ftn10 [https://perma.cc/XT5Y-NQYX] (Colorado,
Delaware, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin). Some states have failed to keep public
commitments to provide work slots for those that would be denied aid for which they are
otherwise eligible.
David A. Super, Opinion, The New Republican Farm Bill Will Dismantle Our Programs to
Feed the Needy, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2018, 4:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ opinion/oped/la-oe-super-farm-bill-snap-20180511-story.html [https://perma.cc/95DE-9J5N].
See HANNAH KATCH ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TAKING MEDICAID
COVERAGE AWAY FROM PEOPLE NOT MEETING WORK REQUIREMENTS WILL REDUCE LOWINCOME FAMILIES’ ACCESS TO CARE AND WORSEN HEALTH OUTCOMES (2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-8-18health2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QZK7-QS4R].
Dottie Rosenbaum, 6 Takeaways From CBO Estimate of House Agriculture Committee
SNAP Proposals, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 3, 2018, 5:00 PM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/6-takeaways-from-cbo-estimate-of-house-agriculturecommittee-snap-proposals [https://perma.cc/W3U7-NP46].
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thousands of people would lose eligibility under the Medicaid waiver that the
Trump administration just approved.29
Initial data from partial
implementation of Arkansas’s Medicaid waiver found thousands of people
disqualified.30
C.

Legal Problems With the Administration’s Waivers

The administration’s waiver policy, and the individual state waivers that
its Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is approving, raise
several serious legal problems. First, they do not seem to “promot[e] the
objectives of” the Medicaid statute.
Second and related, the administration’s embrace of these waivers
represents a complete reversal of CMS’s prior interpretation of section 1115 as
not allowing these waivers because they tend to reduce Medicaid coverage.
Third, approving a waiver for Kentucky the day after the administration
announced that it would approve such waivers, and others soon afterwards,
ensures that the waivers did not comply with section 1115(d)’s requirement for
public hearings and engagement on proposed demonstration projects.
Fourth, these waivers are inconsistent with Congress’s resolution of the
question of work requirements for Medicaid,31 which allows termination of
Medicaid only for adults who received cash assistance under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant32 who “refus[e] to work,”
and even then, only for so long as such refusal continues. These limitations on
Medicaid termination reflect clear congressional intent to limit denials of
health care.33 Proposed legislation to repeal and replace the Affordable Care
Act would have allowed states to impose such limitations, but that bill failed in
Congress.34 Thus, instead of exploring new policies that might prove of interest

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, KENTUCKY WAIVER WILL HARM
MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES 2 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/116-18health.pdf [https://perma.cc/X638-A2JB].
Robin Rudowitz & MaryBeth Musumeci, An Early Look at State Data for Medicaid Work
Requirements in Arkansas, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.kff.org
medicaid/issue-brief/an-early-look-at-state-data-for-medicaid-work-requirements-inarkansas/ [https://perma.cc/BWJ3-PGF9].
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1(b)(3)(A) (2012).
Id. §§ 601–15.
See Camacho v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 408 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2005).
Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They Will Not Vote on Health Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/mcconnellobamacare-repeal-graham-cassidy-trump.html.
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to Congress, these waivers merely resuscitate policies Congress has already
rejected.
Finally, the plausibility of these waivers as genuine demonstration projects
is dubious: The administration’s letter is gauzy about what sort of evaluation is
required, and any plausible research objectives would be better served by
changing the rules only for the people whom researchers wish to study, leaving
the rules unchanged for a “control group” of others. If the administration
approves all pending waivers, it will have changed basic eligibility policies for
people representing almost 15 percent of national Medicaid enrollment,35 far
more than is needed to test any research hypothesis. Because the waiver
authority is limited to demonstration projects, the absence of a serious research
design likely renders the waivers ultra vires. To be sure, the AFDC and
Medicaid waivers earlier administrations granted crossed the statewideness
threshold, drawing mixed reactions from the courts.36 Although some of these
earlier waivers are open to some of the same criticisms lodged here, they came
in the context of an administrative law regime in which all parties felt some
obligation to moderate their actions to preserve a broad legitimating consensus.
They also did not directly contradict an explicit statutory policy of Congress.37
Particular proposed waivers that the administration is entertaining show
even more starkly the absence of a serious research agenda. Several proposals
come from states that have refused to accept the Affordable Care Act’s
expansion of Medicaid. This expansion sought to ensure that families whose
incomes are too low to qualify for the Act’s premium tax credits could get
health insurance through Medicaid. In non-expansion states, even a very
modest job can render a family ineligible for health insurance, with too much
income to qualify for Medicaid and too little to qualify for premium tax credits.
As a result, if those states implement “work requirement” waivers, recipients

35.

36.
37.

See May 2018 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, MEDICAID.GOV (2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollmentdata/report-highlights/index.html [https://perma.cc/MH4J-66QD] (providing most recent state
Medicaid enrollment data); Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and
Pending Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 29, 2018)
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/which-states-have-approved-and-pending-section1115-medicaid-waivers/?utm_source=web&utm_medium=trending&utm_campaign=
waivers [https://perma.cc/PWY7-XEAZ] (identifying twelve states with pending or
approved work requirement waivers).
Compare Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding grant of statewide waiver
arbitrary and capricious in absence of clear justification in record), with C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying a more lenient standard).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E)–(G) (2012) (finding that lacking insurance causes severe
adverse economic and social effects).
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who do not find jobs will be sanctioned off of Medicaid and those that do find
work risk being terminated for being over-income.38 When Mississippi, a nonexpansion state with some of the lowest Medicaid eligibility limits in the country,
candidly stated that the purpose of its waiver was to reduce costs, CMS apparently
directed the state to remove that language from its waiver application to preserve
the illusion of an experiment in how to achieve Medicaid’s purposes.39
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SOFT-POWER HIATUS

Courts justify the general regime of deference to administrative agencies
by relying on the assumption that the executive branch is ordinarily seeking to
adhere to the law. In such situations, the executive generally should be given
latitude to act in the manner it thinks best. This approach remains viable,
however, only if the courts rescind deference when the underlying assumption
of good faith is violated. If the courts do not treat fidelity to law as a precondition
to deference, they have little justification for retaining judicial review at all. At
that point, they are not so much deferring to administrative interpretations and
exercises of discretion as they are transferring legislative power from Congress to
the president. This gives administrations little incentive to take the law
seriously and misleads a public that naturally assumes that courts vet
challenged actions before upholding them; the impression of judicial
endorsement thus impedes democratic connection and risks enmeshing the
courts in electoral politics.
Courts recognizing this problem might apply a variant on the formula
Justice Jackson suggested in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer
concurrence.40 Agencies’ powers would be greatest when they demonstrated a

38.

39.

40.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, many Medicaid recipients whose incomes increase beyond
their states’ pre-expansion eligibility limits may receive six months, or possibly twelve
months, of “transitional” coverage. Unless the recipient either loses the job or receives
raises sufficient put her or him above the poverty line, however, that job would render her
or him ineligible after a maximum of one year. CMS has discussed including a limited
extension of transitional eligibility in “work requirement” waivers for non-expansion
states, but the fundamental problem still remains: the very activity that the waivers
demand endangers beneficiaries’ access to health coverage.
Colby Itkowitz, The Health 202: Mississippi Quietly Amends Its Medicaid Work
Requirement Waiver, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/08/09/the-health-202-mississippiquietly-amends-its-medicaid-work-requirement-waiver/5b6b0fdb1b326b0207955fca/?utm_
term=.b0744b559a16 [https://perma.cc/TWN3-ZCA5].
343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
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serious effort to discern statutes’ meaning and generally engage in diligent factfinding with procedural openness. The U.S. Supreme Court effectively
embraced this approach in United States v. Mead Corp., which limits Chevron
deference to cases in which the agency makes policy through inclusive
procedures and those in which Congress demonstrated a desire for the agency’s
rules to have the force of law.41
Shared structural norms are at least as important as specific legal rules
in establishing the rule of law in the administrative state because legal rules are
written against the background of the then-prevailing normative ideology.
Dangers of legal rules being misused that are possible only under other
normative systems are either not considered in the legislative process or, if
raised at all, are dismissed as paranoid.
We have never previously seen the systemic rejection of the administrative
state’s structural consensus that characterizes the current administration. The
closest analogies come from individual agencies’ occasional efforts to disregard
the usual checks and balances. Perhaps the best-known of these is the Social
Security Disability Insurance crisis of the early and mid–1980s. There, the
Reagan administration set out to purge huge numbers of people from the
rolls despite serious demonstrable impediments to work. It sought to
leverage the deferential standard of review for the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA’s) decisions to cover denials and terminations
motivated far more by fiscal concerns than by a serious evaluation of the
evidence.42 As this became apparent, the courts, including the Supreme Court,
came to believe the SSA was not making a sincere effort to administer the
existing legal regime.43 As a result, courts developed a range of extraordinary
deference-rejecting doctrines.44 Perhaps the most striking example of this was
in Bowen v. City of New York, with the Supreme Court finding that SSA had
adopted secret lawless policies rendering the formal review process all but
meaningless.45 These extraordinary measures did not metastasize to damage
the rest of administrative law, and indeed they were largely absent from SSDI
law just a few years later once the agency discontinued its defiance.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”
(footnote omitted)).
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See DAVID A. SUPER, PUBLIC WELFARE LAW 1202–06 (2017) (describing the Reagan purge
and the backlash it generated).
See, e.g., Schisler v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1988); Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d
294, 298 (2d Cir. 1987); Wier ex rel. Wier v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 956–57 (3d Cir. 1984).
See, e.g., Spencer v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1986).
476 U.S. 467 (1986).
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On a smaller scale, the D.C. Circuit in the late 1990s and early 2000s came
to regard the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ treatment of Native American trust
accounts as utterly lawless and imposed startlingly intrusive remedial measures
on the entire Interior Department.46 Many, although not all, federal circuits
regarded the Bush administration’s restructuring of the Board of Immigration
Appeals as producing systematically lawless decisions and embraced special
presumptions against agency regularity.47 Each of these episodes saw a sudden
collapse of longstanding regimes of deference and witnessed dramatic, if
relatively short-lived, expansions in the scope of remedies courts were willing to
employ. As the agencies disregarded the soft-power constraints from other
players in administrative law, the courts responded with hard power of their
own.
This Part examines three tools available to courts to restrain potentially
lawless agencies. It argues that these tools merit modification during periods of
systematic disregard for the administrative state’s norms.
A.

The Anti-Delegation Doctrine

In a pair of cases decided in 1935, the Supreme Court held that Congress
may not delegate effective lawmaking power to the executive branch without
meaningful standards that constrain the exercise of that power.48 The Court
has not explicitly invoked the anti-delegation doctrine to decide a case since
1935, but it has declined numerous opportunities to dispense with it altogether.
Justices at both49 ends of the ideological spectrum have invoked it in separate
opinions. Justice Rehnquist provided the fifth vote for invalidating an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation with a
concurrence concluding that OSHA’s statute violated the anti-delegation
doctrine.50
The Court has kept this doctrine in reserve for addressing a serious
emergency. That emergency has arrived. The courts should recognize that the
current administration’s reading of section 1115 as authorizing it to disregard
statutory requirements with which it disagrees at least raises serious

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005).
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 271–80 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the result).
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constitutional questions51 about whether section 1115 is an unconstitutional
delegation of the power to make law.52 Accordingly, the courts should interpret
section 1115’s requirements strictly to require good-faith demonstration
projects limited to the scope necessary to test a plausible research hypothesis.
For the Court not to invoke the doctrine in these circumstances would
raise the question of whether it could ever be used at all: If the current situation
is not sufficiently problematic to justify invoking these reserved judicial powers,
then situations that would justify invoking them must be so spectacularly rare
as to undercut these powers’ very justification. Indeed, if the anti-delegation
doctrine is regarded as one that no rational court would invoke, its only role
will be to empower some possible future irrational Court.
Formally, the disposition of anti-delegation claims has depended on
whether the challenged statutory standard constrains executive action
sufficiently as to avoid a delegation of legislative powers.53 Given the
remarkable gauziness of the statutory provisions the courts have upheld against
challenges under the anti-delegation doctrine, the unspoken question is
whether adherence to the normative administrative law consensus combined
with these statutory limits suffices to make executive activity effectively nonlegislative. Thus, for example, section 1115’s authority only effectively
constrains administrative action if “promoting the objectives of” the Medicaid
statute is a standard with meaning: If an administration feels free to substitute
its own purposes for those of the statute then section 1115 becomes every bit as
open-ended a license to rewrite duly-enacted statutes as was the line-item veto
struck down in Clinton v. City of New York.54
Many battles over the anti-delegation doctrine have involved systemically
important statutes: wage-and-price controls for the whole economy,55 the
authority of major agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)56
and OSHA57 to act, sentencing in all federal criminal cases,58 and so forth. Yet
some of the most sweeping delegations occur in numerous “safety valve”
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (requiring courts to adopt
plausible readings of statutes that avoid substantial constitutional questions).
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down statute authorizing
president to designate provisions of appropriations and tax law that would not be
followed).
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998).
See generally Yakus, 321 U.S. at 414; Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 737.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Industrial Union Department, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result).
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
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provisions of federal statutes that grant sweeping powers to executive agencies
for use only in very limited circumstances, such as natural disasters,59 focused
research projects,60 unanticipated trade conflicts,61 or threats to national
security.62 These provisions’ narrow substantive scope allows both Congress
and the courts to worry less about administrative overreach. These provisions
can serve valuable purposes at the frontiers of governance, where Congress’s
capacity to anticipate needs is at its weakest.
These provisions’ continued viability, however, depends on ensuring that
they remain limited in scope. Their very open-textured character could allow
administrators to transform them into Trojan horses, radically redirecting
substantive law without congressional approval. When administrators abuse
limited-purpose grants of authority in that way, they prompt future Congresses
to rethink the wisdom of enacting such broad legislation and thus threaten the
sustainability of these safety valve provisions. These safety valve provisions’
benefits would also be lost if a court invoked the anti-delegation doctrine to
invalidate them outright.
Increasingly, however, the Court has sought to assuage the concerns
underlying the anti-delegation doctrine through less absolute means. It has
restricted who may exercise particularly broad, potentially problematic
delegated powers.63 It has read other constitutional provisions formally to
block some sweeping delegations64 and make others politically uncomfortable
by denying Congress any control in the execution of laws other than by
enacting new statutes.65 And although the Court has said in dicta that agencies
cannot save delegations with limiting constructions,66 the courts can certainly
do so under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.67 The Court has
constrained delegations to prosecutors with various plain-statement rules;68 it
could do so for executive officials more generally.
Under this latter approach, the Court could require a plain statement in
the relevant statute that executive discretion is intended to reach the outer
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

7 U.S.C. § 2014(h) (2012).
Id. § 2026(b).
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 550 (1976).
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010); United States v. Hammoud,
381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004).
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (invalidating line-item veto).
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (disallowing role for congressional
appointee); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (disallowing legislative veto).
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 610 (6th Cir. 2004).
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limits of its constitutionally permissible powers before concluding that a
sweeping delegation was intended. Absent such legislative direction, the courts
would interpret the statutory limits on agency discretion fairly, rather than
deferentially. Thus, for example, the courts would actually seek to determine
the purposes of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and whether Medicaid
work requirement waivers plausibly advanced those purposes, rather than
assuming that that vague language was intended to empower the agency.
In these cases, judicial intervention paradoxically increases executive
flexibility in the long term by obviating the need for Congress to purge statutes
of the authority being abused. Courts often vindicate exercises of executive
power in order to keep free the hands of future administrations rather than
because of any particular merit in the action at hand. Here, striking down
abuses of these sweeping delegations can provide the reassurance for Congress
to continue granting such powers in the future. Congress can only safely
include them in statutes if it has confidence that executive officials will exercise
this power with restraint and that, when they utterly fail to do so, courts will
insist. The failure to do so will cause many of them to be withdrawn over time,
which does not serve the public interest well at all. Thus, a judicial check on
abuses of delegated executive authority will, in the middle and long term,
actually expand executive power, or at least legitimate exercises of that power.
If the courts ignore blatant attempts to reverse congressional decisions
through section 1115, future Congresses are likely to feel the need to repeal or
radically restrict that section in order to make their judgments stick. Section
1115’s complete demise would undermine its core purpose: evidence-based
policy development. A more constructive approach would be for courts to
invoke constitutional avoidance to interpret the statutory requirements for
such waivers—that they be actual demonstration projects and that they be
consistent with the purposes of the Social Security Act—as precluding attempts
at executive nullification of congressional choices. This would lead to
disallowing the waivers imposing new work conditions on Medicaid eligibility
on the grounds that they effectively reject decisions Congress took in 1996 and
2010 and seek to revive legislation defeated in 2017. In the same vein, courts
invoking constitutional avoidance could disallow these waivers because they
represent efforts to change policy on a broad basis rather than a serious effort to
learn about new policies’ impact through discrete, rigorous, experiments.
The alternative—deferential acceptance of executive authority to rewrite
statutes—is as unsustainable as it is subversive of the separation of powers. If
President Trump can nullify congressional decisions to extend Medicaid
benefits, future presidents could override limits Congress has decided to
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impose on eligibility for benefits. A wide range of factors—from safe housing
to good nutrition to education—have been found to improve health outcomes.
If the current waivers pass muster, no principled basis would exist to stop future
administrations from allowing states to expand food assistance or housing
programs with Medicaid funds under section 1115. Broad deference to
executive actions under authority as sweeping as section 1115 could readily lead
to chaos, with wild policy swings each time the White House changes hands.
Courts using constitutional avoidance and the anti-delegation
doctrine to rein in section 1115 waivers would also have the salutary effect
of inducing Congress to play a more active role in considering and making
policy. This likely would result in executive moves being either ratified or
rejected. An administration seeking to test policies that fundamentally
alter a program’s course would have to seek congressional approval,
perhaps in the program’s annual appropriations act. This would be in keeping
with Justice Jackson’s admonition in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer69 that
the extent of executive power should depend on the extent of congressional
support.
B.

Substantive Review

In exercising substantive review of radical waivers under section 1115,
the courts should recognize that familiar doctrines of deference are ill-suited
to the task. Ordinarily, agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they are charged
with implementing often receive strong deference from courts, and agencies’
exercises of delegated discretion are reversed only if found to be arbitrary and
capricious or abuses of discretion. These doctrines’ premises are that the
executive is permitted to adapt the legislative regime to different priorities and
points of emphasis, but that it is not permitted to break with the regime it
inherited, absent new legislation. This is sometimes a difficult line to draw.
No such difficulty exists, however, when an administration makes a
major, high-profile effort to enact legislation, repeatedly fails, and then exploits
a delegation of exception-making authority to make many of the same changes
via administrative law. No deference is appropriate when an administration
seeks to accomplish through administrative reinterpretation what Congress
refused to do through legislative amendment. Thus, for example, had President
Clinton responded to the defeat of his health care reform proposal with new,
expansive interpretations of the Medicaid statute—or section 1115—to

69.

343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952).
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accomplish the same thing, courts should have shown him no deference.
Similarly, when the current administration responded to the defeat of its
legislation to reduce eligibility for Medicaid and health care premium subsidies
by reversing longstanding interpretations to achieve the same thing, the courts
should recognize this as an attempt at overturning rather than interpreting the
will of Congress. The administration’s numerous actions, many of
questionable legality,70 with the avowed purpose of impeding implementation
of the Affordable Care Act, confirm that restricting health care subsidies,
notwithstanding Congress’s refusal to repeal that Act, is its objective, not
sincere policy research.
As a threshold matter, Chevron deference—the doctrine that when a
statute does not address an issue, the courts should defer to any “reasonable”
agency interpretation—should not even come up with regard to these
interpretations of section 1115, because the Medicaid-waiver approval process
is far less deliberative or inclusive than those that the Court has said merit
Chevron deference.71 In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court limited this
heightened deference to cases of express or implied delegations of lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies.72 “It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such
force.”73 The Court identified these as formal adjudication, formal rulemaking,
and notice-and-comment rulemaking, all of which provide for extensive
participation by the affected parties in shaping the agency’s statutory
interpretation. The Department of Health and Human Services has never
promulgated substantive rules setting out its understanding of what section 1115
allows, and the process by which it makes those decisions ad hoc on particular
waivers is far less formal or inclusive than those the Court recognized as worthy
of broad deference.
Even if Chevron did apply, these waivers would not merit deference. The
Court sometimes justifies Chevron deference by arguing that Congress likely
intended for the agency, rather than the courts, to resolve ambiguities.74 This
likely is true when the agency in question is playing the kind of role Congress

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Nicholas Bagley & Abbe R. Gluck, Trump’s Sabotage of Obamacare Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/trump-obamacare-illegal.html.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 227.
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could plausibly have envisioned. Congress knows that some future
administrations will be of the opposite party and, when choosing ambiguous
terms in legislation, surely takes into account the power it is granting to future
administrations with divergent policy preferences. Congresses cannot so easily,
however, be charged with the knowledge that a future administration would
operate wholly outside the long-term structural consensus. Many of the
administrative state’s implicit checks and balances operate only over an
extended period, for instance when agencies refrain from indulging their shortterm preferences in order to maintain credibility in the future. When an
administration demonstrates a short-termer’s attitude that effectively frees it
from those constraints, courts seeking to honor Congress’s expectations must
apply more searching review to replace those constraints. Similarly, just as one
basis for deferring to exercises of administrative discretion is the belief that they
are informed by superior capacities for fact-finding, when fact-finding is found
to be dishonest and distorted, exercises of interpretive discretion, even those
not explicitly dependent on that fact-finding, should be questioned.
The simplest basis for scrutinizing section 1115 waivers is to determine
whether they are “likely to assist in promoting the objectives of” the Medicaid
statute.75 Although courts operating within the post–New Deal structural
consensus commonly shy away from seeking to ascertain the objectives of
legislation,76 here the task is not difficult. The administration claims that working
promotes health and that the statute’s purpose is improving health. Neither of
these assertions is straightforwardly true. Medicaid’s purpose is expanding
health insurance coverage, which seems contradictory to a plan expected to deny
coverage to tens of thousands of people in Kentucky alone. As amended by the
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is particularly focused on achieving as nearly
universal coverage as possible to minimize the inefficiencies that result
when hospitals and others provide large amounts of care for which they are
not compensated. Increasing the ranks of the uninsured certainly does not
accomplish that.
In addition, routine application of tools of statutory construction—a
prerequisite to Chevron analysis77—also suggests that section 1115 cannot be
interpreted to support the new waivers. Section 1931 of the Medicaid statute
shows that Congress knows how to craft work requirements and has chosen to
do so in only a very limited way. Legislative silence ordinarily is entitled to little
75.
76.
77.

42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Are Medicaid Work Requirements Legal?, 319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
763 (2018) (approaching these questions within the post–New Deal consensus).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
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weight because it has no recognized standing within the terms of the U.S.
Constitution and because any number of factors can lead to a bill’s failure
(including, most commonly, the legislature’s failure to focus fully). The defeat
of multiple efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act is not mere
ordinary legislative silence: These efforts had extreme salience, and they
were clearly defeated on their merits. This makes clear that the
administration is acting at the nadir of its power, in opposition to past
Congresses that enacted and amended the Medicaid statute over the years, and
with no support from the current Congress that chose not to disturb that
statute. Thus, “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,”78 the
courts may discern a congressional intent inconsistent with the current
administration’s reading of section 1115.
Doctrines for reviewing exercises of executive discretion also demonstrate
how anomalous the new Medicaid “work requirement” waivers are. Even
absent the systemic failures we are now experiencing, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe79 encourages courts to infer purposes from
legislative text and to override administrative actions that either consider
illegitimate factors or disregard mandatory ones. This approach is especially
apt for applying a statute that specifically requires adherence to its “objectives.”
The administration’s desire to reverse its congressional defeat is about as illicit a
purpose as one can readily imagine; its failure to consider the individual and
systemic consequences of increasing the ranks of the uninsured is similarly
unacceptable under Overton Park. This administration’s 180-degree reversal of
its predecessors’ determination of the appropriateness of waivers of this kind
also runs afoul of the principle that changes in direction require clear
explanations of what has changed and why the evidence relied upon in prior
determinations should not dictate continuing the prior policy.80 And the
absence of any explanation why these “demonstration projects” need to operate
statewide, rather than with discrete treatment and control groups, is just the
sort of irrationality that courts often find arbitrary and capricious. Even before
the current administration, and even on issues not recently addressed by

78.
79.
80.

Id.
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009), disclaims any substantive preference
for the prior rule, but it does not dispense with agencies’ obligations to explain their
analysis of the evidence and policy considerations supporting the policies they reverse.

A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law

1611

Congress, courts have occasionally invalidated waivers when serious policy
research did not appear to be the motivating factor.81
Courts weighing section 1115 waivers can learn from their predecessors’
response to the Reagan administration’s purge of the Social Security disability
rolls in the 1980s. The “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable to
those cases is little different from the “arbitrary and capricious” standard courts
will apply to waivers. Just as the courts of the 1980s concluded that no
termination of benefits was supported by substantial evidence unless the agency
showed either that the initial grant of benefits was erroneous or that the
recipient’s medical condition had improved significantly,82 and that medical
conclusions contrary to the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician needed
solid support,83 today’s courts could establish similar elaborations of what is
“arbitrary and capricious” in the waiver context. For example, they could
recognize a presumption that waivers are arbitrary and capricious if they
purport to test policies that Congress has explicitly rejected by statute or if
they remove congressionally-conferred benefits statewide rather than for a
discrete treatment group.
C.

Procedural Review

Procedural review of agencies’ actions balances the agency’s substantive
goals with concern for fair and accurate processes. Under ordinary
circumstances, courts assume that agencies can readily reconcile these goals.
When, however, the substantive needs are exceptionally strong, they may
overwhelm procedural concerns such as the need for a pre-deprivation
hearing84 or allowing the public time to adjust before a new regulation takes
effect. Thus, when affected persons have sued to set aside agencies’ actions for
failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, other statutory or
regulatory procedural requirements, or procedural due process, the Court has
been willing to subordinate those procedural concerns to genuine public
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83.
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Newton-Nations v Betlach, 660 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 2011); Beno v Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th
Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598–600 (1950) (allowing
seizure of allegedly misbranded dietary supplements prior to a hearing); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250–54 (1947) (allowing merger of insolvent financial institution
without a pre-deprivation hearing because of the danger of further losses during any
delay); cf., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607–09 (1974) (finding danger to
disputed property justifies denial of pre-deprivation hearing).
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emergencies, especially when it believes that the agency has a high likelihood of
being correct on the merits.85
Although less explicitly established, the reverse should also be true: When
procedural concerns are especially severe, they should overwhelm the usual
deference to the agency’s choice of substantive goals.86 For example, although
Vermont Yankee87 generally prohibits courts from mandating additional steps
in notice-and-comment rulemaking beyond those specified in section 553 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, it does make an exception for extraordinary
circumstances.88 One such circumstance is compelling evidence that the
agency is not acting in good faith, as when an agency seeks to override
legislation it disfavors through the regulatory process.
Vermont Yankee’s general prohibition of judicially-crafted additional
procedures does not apply to judicial review of the Medicaid work requirement
waivers, because the agency has altogether declined to engage in notice-andcomment rulemaking to promulgate its new Medicaid eligibility policy.
Moreover, Congress has established additional procedural requirements for
policymaking through section 1115. Courts can and should determine
whether waivers were issued in compliance with these requirements as well
as whether additional development of the record is needed to determine
whether a waiver meets section 1115’s substantive requirements.
Separately, HBO v. FCC89 held that, when the volume and intensity of ex
parte communications render the formal agency record illusory, the
Administrative Procedure Act’s judicial review provisions allow courts to
demand that the agency give a full public airing of concerns. As one waiver was
approved only one day after the administration announced its new policy, and
others followed soon thereafter, the formal record of these actions obviously
does not tell the real story. Reviewing courts should thus vacate waivers
granted under these conditions and direct the agency to reconsider its decisions
through new proceedings that produce a record actually reflecting what the
agency is considering. At a minimum, courts should not confine the record on

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See, e.g., Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 611–13 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing agency to
dispense with notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement budget-cutting legislation
timely); Phila. Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 882–85 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
To do otherwise would effectively concede that substantive needs are inherently superior
to procedural ones, which makes little sense as a matter of either the APA’s text or
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Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
Id. at 542.
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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review to the items formally presented to the agency when other information and
motivations obviously drove the rapid decisions.
The substantive needs of agencies must be constantly balanced with the
mandate of procedural regularity. Courts recognize that exceptional
substantive needs sometimes require subjugating procedural ones. The reverse
should also be true: When procedural irregularities are severe, they should
override routine, nonemergency substantive objectives.
III.

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN A SOFT-POWER HIATUS

As Jon Michaels has powerfully demonstrated, in the administrative
state’s implicit separation of powers, career civil servants hold responsibilities
closely analogous to those of the courts under the constitutional separation of
powers.90 With protected tenure, career civil servants are expected to uphold
the rule of law and to protect systemic interests that transcend the agenda of
any particular administration. Indeed, much of their power derives from the
courts: Not only do the courts enforce civil service laws to shield them from
politically motivated dismissals, but the standard of review strongly favors
administrative actions crafted by career bureaucrats over those thrown together
by political appointees. When career bureaucrats write thorough notices of
proposed rulemaking and meticulously respond to all comments received,
courts commonly find adherence to the Administrative Procedure Act’s noticeand-comment requirements. More generally, bureaucrats are well positioned
to amass the combination of data and arguments that persuade courts that
decisions were not arbitrary and capricious.91
In ordinary times, this process is constructive: Input from civil society and
norms of legality filter through civil servants to produce decisions within the
general terms set out by political appointees. In the current environment,
however, political appointees are driving an ideological agenda that respects
neither Congress’s legislative choices nor the input of civil society. For
bureaucrats to perform their usual roles in this environment would not be to
90.
91.

See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 60–61 (2017).
In Michaels’s framing, civil society’s role in the administrative separation of powers is
analogous to the role of Congress in the constitutional separation of powers representing
the diversity of social opinion on a given topic. Most directly, political appointees in
administrative agencies mirror the role of the president in the constitutional system,
initiating policy decisionmaking and focusing debates with specific proposals. Just as civil
servants derive much of their power from the support of the courts, civil society’s influence
comes at least in part from its ability to mobilize factions within Congress, and political
appointees derive their power from the president’s support.
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develop public policy but rather to obscure the processes behind it. Giving the
appearance that public comments were considered when in fact they were not,
or that expertise shaped a decision when it did not, creates a false record that
can only mislead courts and, ultimately, the electorate.92 Not only are
bureaucrats not required to do this, but their oaths to uphold the Constitution
and laws of the United States forbid them from doing so.93
The Rules of Professional Responsibility provide an appropriate guide to
the obligations of civil servants, even non-lawyers.94 This metaphor, of course,
requires a judgment about who should be regarded as the “client,” but civil
servants’ oaths are to the United States, not to their current political officials.
Even to the extent that those officials are seen as having authority to say what
the goals of the government are, civil servants, like attorneys, may pursue their
clients’ goals only through lawful means. To give a false aura of deliberation95
to politically preordained decisions is tantamount to engaging in a coverup.
In attempting to honor their obligations to the nation as a whole, rather
than their current political masters, civil servants should consider several
concrete steps, each entirely legal. First and most obviously, they should
maintain scrupulous honesty in everything they write, both for internal and
external consumption. If they do not believe that the research supports a
particular proposition, they should not write that it does. This does not mean
that civil servants need to be abrasive or obstructionist or that they need
constantly to oppose political appointees’ decisions. But civil servants should
not pretend that such decisions reflect the views of career staff or that they
were driven by factors that they were not. This honesty is a service to the
political appointees—keeping them from losing track of which decisions
were political calls and which were genuine expertise-driven policies that they
can expect career staff to defend to their successors in future administrations.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009).
Cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443
(2018) (arguing that many bureaucrats should be understood as officers of the U.S.).
Cf. Jennifer Nou, Taming the Shallow State, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/taming-the-shallow-state-by-jennifer-nou [https://perma.cc/ Z8RQMD2B] (discussing limits to bureaucratic resistance).
For example, if a state makes clear that the purpose of its waiver request is to save money
rather than to advance the purposes of the Act, counseling the state to obscure that goal in
its waiver request misleads potential public commenters, the courts, and other
decisionmakers. The public record suggests that this may have happened at least with
respect to Mississippi’s waiver request. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
Similarly, when career staff that lack the authority to reject a waiver application write
rebuttals to novel public comments opposing those waivers without bringing those
comments to the attention of the actual decisionmakers, the rebuttals are likely to mislead
reviewing courts into believing that those are the reasons the comments were rejected.
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Second, in preparing analyses of comments received from the public, civil
servants should resist the common impulse to lump together similar but
nonidentical comments or to capture only the highpoints of comments making
many arguments. Congress and reviewing courts should be able to rely on the
accuracy and completeness of comment summaries prepared by impartial civil
servants.
Third, civil servants should be entirely honest in describing why public
comments are being disregarded. If political appointees have determined that
the goal of transforming Medicaid should override any contrary concerns, civil
servants preparing responses to public comments should simply say as much,
rather than inventing objections and explanations that did not, in fact,
influence the decision. Although both expertise and political decisions will, at
times, merit deference, Congress and reviewing courts should be able to tell the
difference between the two.
Fourth, civil servants should decline to cut legally mandated corners to
comply with artificial deadlines set by political officials. Managers naturally
should be responsive to political appointees in reassigning additional staff to
high-priority projects, and individual civil servants should work
conscientiously on their assigned projects, but neither are responsible for the
unrealistic expectations of political appointees who may have little experience
with the machinery of government. Career managers should be candid with
political appointees about how long various tasks will require, but if political
appointees disregard that advice, then the managers cannot be held responsible
for failing to completely execute all tasks before the administration leaves office.
If political appointees order civil servants to move forward without completing
the required steps, the career staff should obey but should not participate in any
effort to mislead readers into believing that those steps were performed.
Finally, if anything they write is edited without their agreement to
misrepresent their views, they should protest immediately and formally.
Political appointees are entitled to attempt to make policy on their own, but
they are not entitled to pass their views off as those of career civil servants.
All of these are sound principles even in ordinary times when
administrative law is operating within the post–New Deal consensus. These
steps take on new, vital meaning, however, when the longstanding norms of
administrative law are being disregarded. In such circumstances, civil servants’
participation will matter far more because political appointees operating
outside the New Deal consensus may feel they cannot afford to be candid about
what they are doing without losing judicial and congressional deference.
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In the particular case of Medicaid waivers to disqualify unemployed
persons, the courts’ belief that these are genuine demonstration projects is crucial
to those waivers being upheld. A part of justifying that belief is designing
credible evaluations. If a civil servant believes that these are not true
demonstration projects because the officials approving them are not seeking to
test new policy concepts but rather to change the law without involving
Congress, then presenting a superficially plausible evaluation is essentially a
coverup of the true nature of these actions. Thus, for example, if civil servants
believe useful policy information cannot be obtained without studying a
control group for comparison, they should not write rationales for omitting
one. If they believe that little useful policy information can be obtained by
applying the demonstration statewide, they should not manufacture reasons
why statewideness supports research goals.96 And if civil servants believe that
an evaluation is failing to measure important health outcomes, they should
refuse to sign off on any statement to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
At some point, this period of bare-knuckles, hard-power administrative
law will end. It is too disruptive and chaotic to serve even the deregulatory
interests that helped set it in motion. The same willful disdain that has caused
this administration to cast aside the post–New Deal consensus that supported
the soft-power regime of administrative law has caused it to take numerous
other actions that have alienated voters. Moreover, the electorate’s disposition
is too conservative—and too wedded to social niceties—to tolerate this for very
long. To be sure, the tumult of the Trump Era could give way to a more
buttoned-down, organized pursuit of the same goals under a Mike Pence or a
Paul Ryan. More likely, however, the next president and Congress will
resubscribe to the post–New Deal structural consensus, whatever their
substantive goals.
The response courts and civil servants adopt to the current conditions
should provide as little impediment as possible to the revival of efficient
administrative management. The approach advocated here—an explicitly
temporary suspension of deference to political leaders who disregard their roles
in the structural consensus—is most conducive to that goal. A weaker response
that ignores the lawlessness of the current administration could well lead to a
96.

See Beno v Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking down demonstration project
supposedly testing the work incentives of benefit cuts because the state did not expect
many of those subject to the project to work).
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search for perpetrators and collaborators once this moment is passed. The
President’s repeated embraces of a “Lock her up!” sentiment does not augur
well for persuading his opponents to refrain from prosecuting all those officials
implicated criminally in scandals. They also may seek to purge civil servants
who appear to have been selected by these political appointees. The resulting
upheaval would be messy, expensive, and sometimes unjust. As noted above, a
perception that the judiciary acquiesced in executive lawlessness would
undermine both the courts’ reputation as protectors of the rule of law and the
rationale for judicial review.
The goal, instead, should be the modern equivalent of the Act of
Indemnity and Oblivion that Charles II enacted in 1660.97 That statute paved
the way for the restoration of the English monarchy after the Puritan
Revolution had deposed and killed Charles’s father, King Charles I. It struck a
balance between civic peace and erasing the illegitimate excesses of the Puritans’
Commonwealth, voiding much of the law enacted during the interregnum but
forgoing retribution against any but the bloodiest Cromwellians.
Conversely, a wholesale rejection of deferential judicial review not
specifically tied to the current administration’s abrogation of the post–New
Deal consensus would impede its reestablishment once the emergency has
passed. If courts justify their refusal to afford deference as a broader rethinking
of the role of judicial review, they may have difficulty finding rationales for
walking back their anti-deference rulings under more law-abiding
administrations in the future. Ironically, announcing a generically more
intrusive form of judicial review now could slow a restoration regime’s reversal
of lawless actions undertaken during this period.
Available precedent, albeit limited, offers hope that a limited departure
from deferential review is eminently reversible once the emergency passes.
After the courts savaged President Reagan’s Social Security Administration for
disregarding substantive and procedural norms in its administration of
disability benefits, when a new commissioner took office and explicitly
committed the agency to adhering to the law, the courts rapidly receded into
their accustomed posture. Cases that would have prompted angry reversals a
few years earlier received minimalist affirmances from the same courts. If
anything, having trounced SSA during the period when it was behaving
lawlessly, many judges seemed eager to mend fences with the new, more
thoughtful agency.
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Striking down the Medicaid “work requirement” waivers, as the first
federal court to consider one has done,98 need not destroy future
administrations’ ability to conduct serious demonstrations of new policies that
might enhance Medicaid’s performance in any number of ways. Indeed, by
removing the need for a future Congress to repeal section 1115, courts can
preserve and strengthen the authority for genuine policy research.
As this administration proceeds, the issues this Article addresses take on
increasing salience far beyond Medicaid waivers under section 1115. For
example, the Trump administration is relying on a similar “safety-valve”
provision in trade legislation99 to launch a massive trade war. Its claim that our
national security is impaired by importing steel and aluminum from some of
our closest allies is no more credible than its assertion that its Medicaid waivers
are genuine demonstration projects. In both instances, the administration’s
public statements make clear that its actual purposes are entirely different from
those that allow invocation of the safety valve. If the courts sustain
disingenuous invocations of the national security exception to our trade laws,
the only way Congress will be able to prevent a future president from
unilaterally launching a massive and destructive trade war will be to repeal
those sections. That, however, will leave this country without the means to
protect its national security against genuine threats from our adversaries.
Our system encourages courts and civil servants to exercise restraint,
saving their powers and credibility for a rainy day. Today, it is raining.
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